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SOSA'S SILENCE: KIOBEL AND THE FALLACY OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S LIMITATION ON ALIEN TORT LIABILITY
Webster C. Cash III*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that corporations could not be liable under the Alien
Tort Statute ("ATS") for human rights abuses. 2 The decision has stunning
implications for contemporary human rights litigation.3 Indeed, in the short time
since Kiobel was decided in September 2010, a large volume of scholarship has
examined the case's potential to upset the delicate balance of international law. 4
Moreover, rare for any circuit court opinion, Kiobel is the subject of considerable
mainstream media coverage. 5 Whether lawyer or newsman, one fact remains

* Webster C. Cash III was a participant in courses in Private International Law at The Hague
Academy of International Law (Summer 2011). He holds a J.D. from the University of Denver, Sturm
College of Law (2011) and a B.A. from The George Washington University (2007). The author would
like to thank Professor Ved Nanda for his inspirational teaching and support in drafting this article.
1. 621 F.3d Ill (2d Cir. 2010), reh'g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 472 (2011).
2. Id. at 149.
3. See Jonathan Drimmer, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co. and the Alien Tort Statute,
LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/internationalforeigniaw/blogs/intemationalandforeignlawcommentaryarchive/2010/12/14/jonathan-drimmer-onkiobel-v-royal-dutch-shell-petroleum-co-and-the-alien-tort-statute.aspx
("Without question, Kiobel,
breaking with 20 years of federal court decisions on the ATS, is a significant decision. Some 30% of all
corporate ATS cases to date have been brought in the Second Circuit, more than any other. Should the
decision stand, it is a near certainty that federal courts ... will follow suit.").
4. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Meir Feder, Second Circuit Rejects CorporateLiability Under
Alien Tort Statute, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.newyorklawjoumal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?
id-120 2474420042&SecondCircuit Rejects Corporate LiabilityUnderAlienTort Statute; Julian
G. Ku, The Curious Case of CorporateLiability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of
Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 353, 353, 356 (2011); Michael C. Lynch & Lystra Batchoo,
What are the Implications of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum? Is the Decision a Definitive Statement
Against CorporateLiability under the Alien Tort Statute?, 22 No. 1 PRAC. LITIGATOR 57, 57-58 (2011).
5. See John B. Bellinger Ill, Shortening the Long Arm of the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/opinion/09iht-edbellinger.html? r-0 ("Although the court's
decision is at present binding only in the New York region, it may be the death knell for most human
rights litigation against multinational companies in U.S. courts."); Grant McCool, US Judges Dismiss
Nigerian Violence Case vs. Shell, REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/
17/royaldutchshell-nigeria-ruling-idUSN1717331220100917; Kevin Anthony Stoda, Will U.S. Supreme
Court Exempt Corporations from Alien Tort Law-Even as U.S. States Can Still Be Brought to Court?,
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clear: to many, Kiobel stands for the shallow proposition that corporate profits
stemming from business-related human rights abuses may be shielded from victims
Opponents also assert that absent
through the simple act of incorporation.
Congressional action, Kiobel will undermine general principles of corporate
accountability. 7 They argue that freedom from concern over multi-million dollar
class action lawsuits will invite corporations to downgrade their efforts to prevent
Though individual corporate perpetrators-such as
human rights abuses.8
Directors and CEOs-remain susceptible to civil damages under the ATS, the
general reaction to Kiobel appears to be one of cynicism on account of the
corporate protection it imparts.
Others yet have focused less on the decision's press-worthy rule relating to
corporate damages. Instead, they emphasize Kiobel's seemingly unremarkable
holding: "[t]hat international law .

.

. and not domestic law, governs the scope of

liability for violations of customary international law under the ATS." 9 That is,
despite virtual unanimity among civilized nations in recognizing tort actions
against corporate entities, it is the law of nations ultimately controlling who is
liable under the ATS. Though this legalese is somewhat unrevealing, the practical
effect of the language will be "deeply relevant in other settings"-i.e., when the
United States Supreme Court revisits the scope of the ATS. 10
Accordingly, this Article will discuss this perhaps more sedentary aspect of
Kiobel-ostensibly, to uncover the court's reasoning and justification for this
ruling. In reaching its position, this Article will show that the Second Circuit's
interpretation of ATS liability was based partly on an improper reading of footnote
twenty in the Supreme Court's seminal ATS case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.'
Importantly, this Article does not suggest that the Kiobel court was necessarily
incorrect in its conclusion that customary international law precludes juridical
OPED NEWS (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.opednews.com/articles/WILL-U-S-SUPREME-COURT-EXby-Kevin-Anthony-Stod-1 00930-11 .html.
6. See generally Bellinger, supra note 5; see also Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149-50 (Leval, J.,
concurring) ("[O]ne who earns profits by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human
rights can successfully shield those profits from victims' claims for compensation simply by taking the
precaution of conducting the heinous operation in the corporate form.").
7. See Marco Simons, Making Sense of the Kiobel Decision and CorporateLiabilityfor Human
Rights Abuses, EARTHRIGHTS INT. (Sept. 22, 2010), https://www.earthrights.orgfblog/making-sensekiobel-decision-and-corporate-liability-human-rights-abuses ("Beyond the U.S., we need to expand the
scope of accountability for human rights abuses, both geographically and institutionally . .. 'the U.S.
judiciary alone cannot shoulder the burden of providing a forum for adjudicating human rights claims
against companies that arise abroad.' If Shell were subject to a strong accountability regime in
Nigeria-or even in England, or the Netherlands, where it is headquartered-it wouldn't matter whether
it could be sued in the United States.").
8. See id.
9. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126.
10. See Marta Requejo, Kenneth Anderson on Kiovel [sic] v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, CONFLICT
OF LAWS.NET (Sept. 18, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/kenneth-anderson-on-kiovel-v-royaldutch-petroleum/.
I1. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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entities from ATS liability. Instead, it argues simply that the Supreme Court was
silent in Sosa regarding the scope of the ATS' reach. Because the high Court did
not address this issue, it is of course problematic that the Second Circuit
augmented its decision by claiming the Court had ruled squarely on the matter.
Thus, this Article serves as a warning for future litigants to avoid Sosa, as well as
portions of Kiobel, as the sole legal basis for asserting corporations are immune
from liability under the ATS.
Part II will analyze the relevant history of the ATS, as well as the two primary
cases that set forth modem ATS jurisprudence-Filairtiga v. Pefia-Iralal2 and
Sosa. Additionally, Part II will provide necessary background on the widespread
pattern of corporate human rights abuses, such that the full magnitude of the
Kiobel decision can be understood in context. Part III will provide a
comprehensive summary of the Second Circuit's disposition of Kiobel.
Specifically, a detailed analysis of the facts leading up to the plaintiffs' suit in
federal court, the district court's holding, the majority opinion, and Judge Leval's
stinging concurrence-a separate opinion endorsing the majority's final judgment,
but strident enough in its terms to be classified as nothing other than a dissent. In
Part IV, this Article will argue that a key ingredient of the Second Circuit's
holding-its interpretation of footnote twenty from Justice Souter's landmark
opinion in Sosa-was fundamentally incorrect and misapplied Supreme Court
dicta. Primarily, this Article will show that the Second Circuit misconstrued
Sosa's discussion regarding the contours of ATS liability with the separate
consideration of whether international law requires that the State serve as the
tortfeasor. This Article will conclude by stressing that litigants should not rely on
Kiobel's interpretation of Sosa alone while not necessarily ignoring the possible
crystallization of such a rule through other relevant sources of international law.
II.

BACKGROUND

The ATS was enacted by the first Congress as a provision contained in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.'1 Despite its prevalence today, the ATS was seldom used
after its passage in 1789. During the first 200 years of its existence, the statute was
invoked in federal court only twice.14 Though the ATS underwent a major
resurgence in 1980 following Filartiga,it was this rather dormant existence that
came to define the ATS. Judge Friendly, speaking to the ATS' mysterious origins,
noted in his oft-cited remark that "[t]his old but little used section is a kind of legal

12. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. Philip A. Scarborough, Rules of Decisionfor Issues Arising Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 457, 463 (2007).
14. See Andrew M. Scoble, Enforcing the Customary InternationalLaw of Human Rights in
FederalCourt, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 127, 133 n.37 (1986).
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Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act, no one seems
to know whence it came." 15
As one scholar surmised, the ATS "is one of the most widely discussed
provisions in modem international law."' 6 Due to its relatively simple terms, it is
surprising that the ATS has been the basis for both countless civil actions and
vigorous legal debate. Nevertheless, the ATS serves as the primary tool for
foreigners seeking redress concerning international harms. The elegant simplicity
of the ATS-in its entirety-is comprised of nothing more than the following text:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."1 7 In other words, under the statute, an ATS plaintiff (1) must be an
alien and not of U.S. citizenship, (2) the complaint must sound in tort, and (3) the
underlying claim must violate the law of nations.' 8 While the first two components
seldom serve as a source of disagreement, the third prong-whether the law of
nations was violated-is the genesis of endless controversy.' 9
A. Filartigav. Peiha-Irala
The true birth of modem ATS jurisprudence began in 1980, when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decision in Filartiga v.
Peiha-Irala.Filartigainvolved a claim by Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly
Filartiga-both of whom were of Paraguayan origin-against a third Paraguayan
national for the alleged torture and death of a Filartiga family member. 20
Specifically, the Filartigas asserted that the defendant Pefia-Irala, while holding the
office of chief of police in Asuncion, Paraguay, kidnapped Dr. Filartiga's son and
subsequently tortured him to death. 21 The complaint also alleged that Pefia-Irala
had brought a Filartiga family member to the home of Pefila-Irala to show them the
mutilated and tortured corpse.22 The Filartigas maintained that the killing was in
response to their family's known political dissidence against the Paraguayan
government. 2 3 Other attempts by the Filartigas to hold Pefia-Irala accountable for
his actions resulted only in death threats, intimidation, and the disbarment of Dr.
Filartiga's attorney. 24

15. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'l
Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
16. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists",19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221, 221 (1996).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
18. Nicholas Joy, Debate: Did Founders Want U.S. Courts to Look Abroad for Monsters to
Destroy?, THE REC. (Nov. 19, 2009), http://hlrecord.org/?p-9920.
19. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
20. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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By the late 1970s, Dolly Filartiga had immigrated to the United States. She
learned that Pefia-Irala was visiting New York. 25 She filed suit in federal court,
invoking the ATS as her basis for jurisdiction, for alleged acts of torture in
violation of the law of nations. 26 On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the
Second Circuit found that official state torture was a "clear and unambiguous"
violation of customary international law. 27 The court held the ATS provided
district courts with jurisdiction when "an alleged torturer is found and served with
process by an alien within our borders." 28 Also significant was the Filartiga
court's emphasis that the new body of international human rights-following the
events at Nuremberg-was now included in the amorphous definition of the "law
of nations." 29
Thus, Filartiga reinvigorated the dormant ATS into a jurisdictional avenue
that opened the federal courts to aliens seeking damages for human rights
violations constituting a breach of the law of nations. Though the Filartiga
decision remains highly controversial-and was overruled in some aspects by the
Supreme Court in Sosa-its basic holding served as the needed catalyst for alien
plaintiffs to bring suit in federal courts for human rights violations. Indeed, as
Professor Kontorovich has written,
Filartiga transformed the statute into a tool for foreigners to seek
redress in federal courts for a variety of abuses committed by
governments around the world. While only a few courts of appeals
adopted the Second Circuit's view of the statute, this was enough to
allow a wide-ranging docket of ATS cases. 30
B. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Due to a flood of ATS litigation sparked by Filartiga,the various circuit
courts interpreted the ATS in varying ways-leading to major disparities in the
statute's application.3 1 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the United States Supreme
Court was given the opportunity to clarify some of the confusion among the lower
courts and aid in the creation of a uniform approach to the ATS.
In Sosa, Mexican national Humberto Alvarez-Machain filed a civil action
against the United States Drug Enforcement Administration and several Mexican
nationals under, inter alia, the ATS for damages resulting from his abduction and
transfer to the United States for interrogation related to criminal activity. 32
Alvarez's primary ATS claim was that one of the Mexican nationals who aided in
25. Id. at 878-79.
26. Id. at 879.
27. Id. at 884.
28. Id. at 878.
29. Id. at 880.
30. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What PiracyReveals About the
Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 111, 116 (2004).
31. See id.
32. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
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the abduction was liable for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations.33
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld Alvarez's ATS
claim. 34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.35
The Court held that the ATS was solely a jurisdictional statute, and as such,
did not create causes of action based on newly accepted aspects of international
law.36 While the Court said Congress could pass legislation to create new claims
under the ATS, the Court settled on the interpretation that a "very limited set of
claims" were acceptable under the ATS-namely, piracy, offenses against
ambassadors, and violations of safe passage.37 As the Court stated in its own
terms:
[A]lthough the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action, the reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.
The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for
the modest number of international law violations with a potential for
personal liability at the time.38
Additionally, the Court held that the ATS covers newer customary
international law claims so long as those claims resemble the "historical
paradigms" important to and recognized by the framers of the original 1789 Act.39
To meet this test, the Court noted that the contended aspect of customary
international law must be both universal in its acceptance among civilized nations
and specific in its definition. 40 The Court, applying the test, declined to condone
Alvarez's claim that arbitrary arrest and abduction lacked the requisite universality
and specificity to satisfy the new test. 4 1
Sosa can thus be seen as a limitation on the seemingly wide-open grant of
authority to litigate ATS claims flowing from Filartiga. Though Kiobel focuses
primarily on the extent of liability under the ATS, the background of Sosa's facts
and holding is central to better understanding how the Second Circuit
misinterpreted a key piece of dicta contained in the Sosa opinion-especially
because it is in Sosa's dicta that Kiobel formed its conclusion that corporations are
immune for liability under the ATS.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 732.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 738.
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C. A BriefPrimeron Contemporary Corporate Human Rights Abuses
Though Filartiga and Sosa focused on ATS violations perpetrated by
individuals or the State, Kiobel represents a different breed of ATS claim; those
committed by multinational corporations. While many international corporations
have worked tirelessly to ensure that human rights are respected and preserved at
the hands of company business, this has certainly not been the case in many
42
instances. In the past few decades, several high profile cases of corporate human
rights abuses have occurred vis-A-vis environmental disasters-most glaringly, the
BP oil spill, the Exxon Valdez oil disaster, and the tragic gas leak in Bhopal, India.
Additionally, multinational corporations have also committed large-scale human
rights violations in the labor, social, economic, and political contexts. According
to a recent United Nations report, a survey of 320 corporate human rights incidents
found that corporate entities are involved in "the full range of human rights"
abuses.4 3
The ATS has been the most potent tool foreigners have used to sue
corporations for harms sustained by company operations." Though the examples
are countless, many ATS claims arise from well-known American military
entanglements. For instance, in relation to grievous injuries sustained during the
Vietnam War, an ATS claim was filed against Dow Chemical for "knowingly
providing the U.S. government with a poisonous agent (Agent Orange) to be
sprayed on civilians in Vietnam."45 Likewise, as a byproduct of the longstanding
Israeli-Palestinian dispute, suit was filed against Caterpillar Incorporated "for
selling D9 bulldozers to the Israel Defense Forces, knowing they would be used to
destroy homes and injure or kill the [Palestinian] inhabitants."4 6 During the height
of the genocide in the Sudan, Talisman Energy was sued under the ATS for "for
conspiring to commit human rights violations, including war crimes, while
Last, and in the backdrop of the more recent Iraq
engaged in oil operations ....
War, ATS claims were brought against Blackwater Corporation for firing weapons
on Iraqi civilians and Titan Corporation and CACI International for allegedly

42. RALPH G. STEINHARDT, PAUL L. HOFFMAN & CHRISTOPHER N. CAMPONOVO INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERING: CASES AND MATERIALS 663 (2009).
43. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General, Corporations and Human Rights: A
Survey of the Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-relatedHuman Rights Abuse, 2-3, 29, U.N.
Doc.A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (May23,2008), availableat http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G08/136/61/PDF/GO813661 .pdf7OpenElement.
44. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE 3 (2010), available

at http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR Corp.pdf, see also Bellinger, supra note 5 ("Plaintiffs have filed suits
against ExxonMobil, Chevron, Talisman Energy, Rio Tinto and most of the major oil, gas and mining
companies for their activities in Indonesia, Burma, Sudan and Papua New Guinea. Suits have also been
brought against Coca Cola, Pfizer, Caterpillar and Yahoo for actions in Columbia, Nigeria, Gaza, and
China, and against more than 30 companies that did business in apartheid-era South Afiica.").
45. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supranote 44, at 3.

46. Id.
47. Id.
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"conspiring with U.S. officials to torture and abuse people in U.S. custody in Iraq,
including the detainees at Abu Ghraib." 4 8
While the alleged actions of the corporate and government defendants in
Kiobel are certainly alarming, as discussed in the next section, similar conduct by
multinationals corporations is sadly far from rare. Similarly, application of the
ATS as a means of reparation for such harms is an equally prodigious endeavor.
III.

KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUCTCHPETROLEUM CO.

Since 1958, the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
("SPDC")-a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Petroleum ("Royal Dutch") and Shell
Transport and Trading Company PLC ("Shell")-has been involved in oil
exploration and production in Nigeria's Ogoni region. 49 Due to the environmental
implications of oil extraction, locals of the Ogoni region organized the "Movement
for Survival of Ogoni People" ("Movement") in order to protest the resulting
degradation of the region's land.5 0 According to the Ogoni residents, in 1993
SPDC countered the Movement "by enlisting the aid of the Nigerian government
to suppress the Ogoni resistance."5 ' Between 1993 and 1994, Nigerian military
personnel were "alleged to have shot and killed Ogoni residents and attacked
Ogoni villages-beating, raping, and arresting residents and destroying or looting
property-all with the assistance of defendants [SPDC, Royal Dutch, and Shell]." 52
To seek both compensation and justice for the ills afflicted upon them, a
number of Ogoni region residents brought suit against the SPDC-as well as Royal
Dutch and Shell as the parent companies of the SPDC-under the ATS for "aiding
and abetting" the Nigerian forces in "alleged violations of the law of nations."
Specifically, the plaintiffs focused their ATS claims on "(1) extrajudicial killing;
(2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture or cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violation of the rights to life,
liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction."54
A. ProceduralHistory
In September of 2002, the plaintiffs initiated their lawsuit via a putative class
action complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. In March 2003, the defendants "moved to dismiss the Complaint.

48. Id.
49. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. According to the majority, the plaintiffs alleged specifically that the "defendants, inter alia,
(1) provided transportation to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to be utilized as a staging
ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers involved in the attacks, and (4) provided
compensation to those soldiers."
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 124.
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. . on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claims (1) [we]re barred by the act of state
doctrine; (2) [we]re barred by the doctrine of international comity; and (3) fail[ed]
to state claims on which relief c[ould] be granted."56 After Magistrate Judge
Henry B. Pitman recommended that the motion to dismiss "be denied in all
respects," plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in May 2004. 5 The defendants
responded to the amended complaint by filing a second motion to dismiss all ATS
claims, relying heavily on the Sosa.58
In September of 2006, the District Court announced that it had denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss, and instead, "decided to consider Defendants' Sosarelated arguments in support of their assertion that Plaintiffs fail[ed] to state a
claim." 59 The court dismissed four of the plaintiffs' original seven claims (aiding
and abetting property destruction; forced exile; extrajudicial killing; and violations
of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association) because "customary
international law did not define those violations with the particularity required by
Sosa."60 Alternatively, however, the court allowed the plaintiffs' claims to proceed
for the alleged violations centered on "aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and
detention; crimes against humanity; and torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading
With regard to the remaining three ATS claims, the court
treatment."61
"[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of the issues presented and the substantial grounds
for difference of opinion ....62 In other words, the district court found that these
63
three purported human rights violations did not "clearly run afoul of Sosa."
The court certified an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit to decide whether the remaining three ATS claims
were permissible under Sosa. 4
B. The Majority Opinion
On account of the district court's limited role in certifying the validity of
plaintiffs' ATS claims, the Second Circuit's approach to Kiobel took on a wholly
different form. Judge Jose A. Cabranes-writing for the majority-narrowed the
issue to the following summation: "Does the jurisdiction granted by the ATS
extend to civil actions brought against corporations under the law of nations?" 65 In
other words, the court indicated that unlike most other ATS cases-that is, the
ones that hinge on whether a particular harm is recognized under the Sosa and
customary international law ethos-Kiobel turned on how far ATS liability

56. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457,459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

57. Id.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124.
Id.
Id.
Kiobel, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
Id. at 465-68.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117.
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extended. In the eyes of the reviewing appellate court, the dispositive issue in
Kiobel was not whether the plaintiffs' claims under the ATS were compatible with
Sosa, but rather if aliens could bring ATS suits in federal court for alleged harms
against juridical persons-namely, corporations. 6
The court noted that the vast majority of applicable ATS precedent following
Filartiga focused on suits brought against individuals, a fact that prevented
appellate courts from discerning the relationship between the ATS and juridical
entities.67 Though many modem legal systems-including the United Statessubject corporations to tort liability under their own domestic law, the court stated
that the jurisdictional scope of the ATS is governed not by the particular
substantive law of any nation, but by the contours of "a limited number of offenses
defined by customary internationallaw . . . ."68

Thus, as discussed above, the

ATS' jurisdictional grant is limited to only a cause of action crystallized under
customary international law-conditioned by Sosa's methodology for deriving
new tort actions.
As Judge Cabranes opined:
[T]he ATS requires federal courts to look beyond rules of domestic
law, however well-established that may be, to examine specific and
universally accepted rules that the nations of the world treat as binding
in their dealings with one another. As Judge Friendly carefully

explained, customary international law includes only "those standards,
rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between
an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their
common good and/or in dealings inter se.69
Essentially, the court honed a subtle yet crucial distinction in ATS
jurisprudence-"the fact that corporations are liable as juridical persons under
domestic law does not mean that they are liable under international law (and,
therefore, under the ATS)."7 o
The court dispelled the notion that mere consensus or agreement among
civilized nations regarding the validity of a legal norm constitutes its recognition as
a viable piece of customary international law. 71 Alternatively, the court made plain
that controlling precedents-stemming from Filartiga-command that "the
nations of the world . .. demonstrate[]" that the legal norm in question be "mutual,
and not merely several concern" before rising to the level of an "international law
violation within the meaning of the [ATS]."72 Analyzed in this manner, the
majority restated the inquiry in Kiobel to center on "whether a plaintiff bringing an

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 116.
See id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117-18 (emphasis added).
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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ATS suit against a corporation has alleged a violation of customary international
law." 73
1. Emphasis oh the Individual, Not the Juridical
In furtherance of the customary international law analysis required by any
valid ATS claim, the court emphasized that the contemporary focus of
international human rights law after Nuremberg-and more specifically, attaining
justice for international human rights violations-had shifted away from states and
towards individuals. 74 Before the Second World War, the only subjects held
accountable for violations of international law and international human rights were
States. 75 After the events of World War II and the Holocaust, however, the
prosecutors at Nuremberg created a new international norm that would hold
76
individuals personally accountable for their complicity with State functions. The
old method had unduly precluded international tribunals from attaining individual
liability against government officials responsible for the illegal actions taken under
color of state law. As such, the close of the Second World War and the adjoining
Nuremberg trials ushered in a major change in international legal jurisprudence:
individuals, and not simply states, were now held responsible for violations of
international law.78
Despite this resounding victory for victims of human rights abuses, the Kiobel
court qualified use of the term "individual" to relate to its traditional meaning as
employed by the Nuremberg prosecutors. 79 According to the court,
from the beginning ... the principle of individual liability for violations
of international law has been limited to natural persons-not 'juridical'
persons such as corporations-because the moral responsibility for a
crime so heinous and unbounded as to rise to the level of an
"international crime" has rested solely with the individual men and
women who have perpetrated it. 80
The court concluded that this basic framework continued into the second half
of the 20th century, as well as into present day practice of modern international

73. Id.
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id.at 118.
76. Id. at 118-19 (citing Robert H. Jackson, Final Report to the President Concerning the
Nurnberg War Crimes Trial, 20 TEMP. L.Q. 338, 342 (1946)).
77. Id. at 118-19 (citing Jackson, supra note 76).
78. Id. at I19 (citing Jackson, supra note 76).
79. Id.
80. Id. The court quoted the original words of the Nuremberg attorneys to further their argument:
'Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."'
Id. (quoting The Nurnberg Trial (United States v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int'l Military Trib. at
Nuremberg 1946)).
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tribunals. 8 ' As a prime example, the court cited the formation of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC")-in which a proposal to confer the ICC with jurisdiction
over juridical entities was "soundly rejected."82
2. Sosa and the Limited Scope of ATS Liability
As discussed supra, the ATS empowers federal courts with jurisdiction over
claims "by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
In the wake of Justice Souter's majority opinion in
treaty of the United States."
Sosa, the ATS has been classified definitively as a jurisdictional provision that
does not in and of itself create a cause of action. 84 Though the Supreme Court
recognized the validity of ATS claims based on safe conduct, violation of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy-three categories of customary international law
applicable at the time of the ATS' passage-the Sosa Court "held that federal
courts may recognize claims 'based on the present-day law of nations' provided
that the claims rest on 'norm[s] of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms [the Court had] recognized."' 8 5
More directly related to the disposition of Kiobel, however, was the Second
Circuit's emphasis on the text contained in footnote twenty of the Sosa opinion.
Because the main issue before the court turned on the scope of ATS liability, the
majority honed its attention to Sosa's limited discussion of the matter: "The Court
also observed that 'a related consideration is whether internationallaw extends the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or an individual."' 8 6 As a
cursory conclusion that foreshadowed their coming analysis, the court
"conclude[d]-based on international law, Sosa, and our own precedents-that
international law, and not domestic law, governs the scope of liability for
violations of customary international law under the ATS."8 7
i.

Domestic Law Does Not Define the Scope of ATS Liability

According to the court-citing well-known international treatises-"'the
concept of international person is. . . derived from international law.' 88 The court
found it visibly apparent, particularly from the experience of the Nuremberg

81. Id.
82. Id.

83. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
84. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
85. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 125-26 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 126 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting I Oppenheim's InternationalLaw § 33, at 120). The court quoted a portion of the
Restatement of International Law: "Individuals and private juridical entities can have any status,
capacity, rights, or duties given them by international law or agreement . . . ." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, at 70 (emphasis added).
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Tribunal, that "the subjects of international law are determined by international
law, and not individual States." 89 Therefore, under the court's analysis, the
defendants in Kiobel could be liable under the ATS only if customary international
law acknowledged corporations and other juridical persons as entities capable of
perpetrating international harms.
ii.

Sosa and Other Relevant Precedent Mandates International Law
"Determine the Scope of Liability"

In addition to footnote twenty in Sosa's majority opinion, the court
reemphasized the importance of international law as the guardian of which actors
may be liable under the ATS by noting a section of Justice Breyer's concurrence.
Specifically, the court cited Justice Breyer's language that stated "[tihe norm [of
international law] must extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private
actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue." 90 Said in its own words, the Second Circuit
opined that "[a]lthough the text of the ATS limits only the category of plaintiff
who may bring suit (namely, 'aliens'), its requirement that a claim be predicated
on a 'violation of the law of nations' incorporates any limitation arising from
customary international law on who properly can be named a defendant."9 1
This approach, the court concluded, was consistent not only with Sosa, but
Beginning with Filartiga92 -and
also with long heeded Circuit precedent.
followed by the prominent ATS cases Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd.,
Kadic v. Karadzic,94 and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic9 5-the court noted that
federal judges consistently linked the scope of the ATS' liability to the precepts of
customary international law. 96 The most recent example, the Second Circuit cited
its 2009 case, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 97 which
held that "footnote 20 of Sosa, while nominally concerned with the liability of nonstate actors, supports the broader principle that the scope of liability for ATS
violations should be derived from international law."98 Thus, PresbyterianChurch
stands for the proposition that both the scope of the ATS and any substantive tort

89. Id. at 126-27.
90. Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 127 n.30 (emphasis added).
92. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he question of federal
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute ... requires consideration of the law of nations . . . .").
93. 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) ("We have repeatedly
emphasized that the scope of the [ATS's] jurisdictional grant should be determined by reference to
international law.").
94. 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that international law governs in terms of deciding
whether liability attaches to international law violations committed by non-state actors).
95. 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (stating the view that private
entities could not be held liable under the ATS for torture).
96. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128.
97. 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
98. Id- at 258.
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actions be a product of settled customary international law-with both prongs
carrying equal weight in an ATS analysis. 99
Due to the precedent that adhered to the footnote twenty requirement, the
court was confident to say it had "little difficulty holding that, under international
law, Sosa, and our three decades of precedent, we are required to look to
international law to determine whether corporate liability for a 'violation of the law
of nations"' constituted a part of customary international law. 00 Consequently, the
court reasoned that in order to resolve the issue, it had to identify whether
corporate liability for international law violations constituted "a norm 'accepted by
the civilized world and defined with a specificity' sufficient to provide a basis for
jurisdiction under the ATS."10
3.

Corporate Liability vis-h-vis the Customary International Law
Analysis

To begin its analysis of whether corporate liability for violations of the law of
nations amounted to a norm of customary international law, the court stressed the
difficult task and immense scrutiny involved for such a norm to "attain the status"
required.102 Specifically, in any customary international law analysis, the
penultimate process is to consult the correct sources.' 03 The mainstay approach to
surveying nations for a recognized legal norm-and the primary method used by
the court in Kiobel-stems from the now famed passage from Paquete Habana, a
case from the early twentieth century:1
Where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subject of which

they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but
for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. 105
Heeding this approach, the court said that "with those principles [of Paquete
Habana] in mind, we consider whether the sources of international law reveal that
corporate liability has attained universal acceptance as a rule of customary
international law." 0 6 The court then split its customary international law analysis

99.
whether
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 259 (noting that "[r]ecognition of secondary liability is no less significant a decision than
to recognize a whole new tort in the first place [under the ATS].").
See Kiobel, 621 F .3d at 128-30.
Id. at 130 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)).
Id. at 131.
See id. at 131-32.
175 U.S. 677 (1900).
Id. at 700.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132.
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in to individual sub-categories and analyzed the different sources and their
respective treatment of corporate liability in the international arena.
i. International Tribunals
As the bodies primarily responsible for imposing liability for violations of
international law, the court first turned its attention to international tribunals and
their relationship with corporate liability. 0 7
As discussed above, the court placed great emphasis on the history of the
Nuremberg Tribunals-largely due to the Nuremberg experience serving as the
first instance in which a tribunal prosecuted individuals in addition to states.'os
The Nuremberg Tribunals-authorized through the London Charter-were
emphatic that jurisdiction for violations of the law of nations extend to "natural
persons only." 09 As its bright line example, the court focused on the Nuremberg
Tribunals' obvious demurral regarding liability for the well-known Nazi chemical
0
The corporation is best remembered for producing "among
supplier I.G. Farben.o"
other things, oil, rubber, nitrates, and fibers .

.

. harnessed to the purposes of the

Nazi state.""' Additionally, I.G. Farben engaged in widespread human rights
violations: "[I]t is no exaggeration to assert that the corporation made possible the
war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Nazi Germany, including
its infamous programs of looting properties of defeated nations, slave labor, and
genocide.""l 2 However, the more direct link for the purposes of the Nuremberg
prosecutors was I.G. Farben's production of Zyklon B, a lethal insecticide used in
Auschwitz's gas chambers." 3
On account of the obvious human rights violations, twenty-four individuals
affiliated with I.G. Farben were indicted and brought before the tribunal.11 4
Nevertheless, I.G. Farben itself was not named a defendant at Nuremberg. The
court, quoting original materials that covered I.G. Farben's role at Nuremberg,
described the thought process of the Nuremberg officials in rendering this
decision:

107.
108.
109.
110.
I11.
112.

Id.
Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134-36.
Id. at 134.
Id. The court elaborated further on the relationship between Nazi officials and 1.G. Farben:

The depth of the partnership [between the Nazi state and 1.G. Farben] was reached at
Auschwitz, the extermination center [in Poland], where four million human beings were
destroyed in accordance with the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question," Hitler's plan to
destroy an entire people. Drawn by the almost limitless reservoir of death camp labor, I.G.
[Farben] chose to build a great industrial complex at Auschwitz for the production of
synthetic rubber and oil. Id. at 135.
113. Id. at 135.
114. Id.
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We have used the term "Farben" as descriptive of the instrumentality of
cohesion in the name of which the enumerated acts of spoliation were
committed. But corporations act through individuals and, under the
conception of personal individual guilt . .. the prosecution, to discharge
the burden imposed upon it in this case, must establish by competent
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual defendant was either
a participant in the illegal act or that, being aware thereof, he authorized
or approved it." 5
Due partly to this strong language, the Second Circuit stated that "[i]t is thus
clear that, at the time of the Nuremberg trials, corporate liability was not
recognized as a 'specific, universal, and obligatory' norm of customary
international law."" 6
In addition to its analysis of Nuremberg, the court also discussed the
applicability of corporate liability for international law violations in the context of
modem international tribunals."' Specifically, the court focused on the governing
charters of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal
Court."'8 In the case of the former Yugoslavia, a relevant report submitted by the
tribunal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations showcased the tribunal's
explicit rejection of jurisdiction over juridical persons-confining its reach to
natural persons only." 9 Likewise, though the history of the Rwanda tribunal did
not include an express rejection of juridical jurisdiction similar to the Yugoslavia
tribunal, its grant of jurisdiction extended only to natural persons as well.12 0
Moreover, the court focused on the powerful example of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC"). The Rome Statute-which sets forth the ICC's
jurisdiction-limits the ICC's authority to adjudicate "natural persons" only,
aligning it with the approach taken in Nuremberg, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.121
Perhaps even more damaging to the plaintiffs' case was a fact steeped in the
According to the court, during
legislative history of the Rome Statute.
promulgation of the statute's terms, the French delegation attempted to add
language that would have endowed the ICC with jurisdiction over juridical
entities-specifically "corporations."l 22 The court then cited the commentators
who "have explained, the French proposal was rejected in part because 'criminal
liability of corporations is still rejected in many national legal orders' and thus

115. Id. (quoting 7 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 ("THE FARBEN CASE") 11-60(1952)).

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137.
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23
would pose challenges for the ICC's principle of 'complementarity."'l
According to another treatise detailing the creation of the ICC's jurisdiction, the
proposal "was finally withdrawn by the French delegation when it became clear

that there was no possibility that a text could be adopted by consensus .

. .

. [fjor

some delegations the whole notion of corporate criminal responsibility was simply
'alien', raising problems of complementarity."' 24
From this commentary, the court was able to derive a simple conclusion
regarding the possible customary international law status of corporate liability visA-vis international tribunals: "[t]he history of the Rome Statute therefore confirms
the absence of any generally recognized principle or consensus among States
concerning corporate liability for violations of customary international law."l 25
ii. International Treaties

To further its customary international law analysis-that is, through the
method set forth in PaquetteHabana-thecourt turned to international treaties and
the works of publicists to decipher any cognizable trend in corporate liability under
international law.126 Treaties serve as evidence of customary international law
when "an overwhelming majority of States have ratified the treaty, and those
States uniformly and consistently act in accordance with its principles."1 2 7
Though, the court emphasized, "[tihat a provision appears in one treaty (or more) .
. . is not proof of a well-established norm of customary international law."l 28 The
court conceded that while there were numerous ratified treaties centered on
"specialized questions" (e.g. a treaty against "Transnational Organized Crime")
that included provisions extending corporate liability, the treaties themselves were
limited in subject matter and did not adequately incorporate the purpose of
protecting human rights.
As the court explained:
Even if those specialized treaties had been ratified by an "overwhelming
majority" of states ... the fact that those treaties impose obligations on
corporations in the context of the treaties' particular subject matter tells
us nothing about whether corporate liability for, say, violations of
human rights, which are not a subject of those treaties, is universally
recognized as a norm of customary international law. Significantly, to

123. Id. As defined by the Kiobel court "'[c]omplementarity' is the principle, embodied in the
Rome Statute, by which the ICC declines to exercise jurisdiction over a case that is simultaneously
being investigated or prosecuted by a State having jurisdiction over it." Id. at 137 n.39.
124. id. at 137 (quoting Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International
Criminal Court over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal
Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 157
(Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 137, 140.
127. Id. at 137 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003)).
128. Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted).
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find that a treaty embodies or creates a rule of customary international
law would mean that the rule applies beyond the limited subject matter
of the treaty and to nations that have not ratified it. To construe those
treaties as so-called 'law-making' treaties-that is, treaties that codify
existing norms of customary international law or crystallize an emerging
rule of customary international law-would be wholly inappropriate and
without precedent.129
Because the court found these specialized treaties failed to ripen into a
generalized rule of customary international law, basing the existence of a new
international norm on a few select treaties would "create friction in our relations
with foreign nations and, therefore, would contravene the international comity the
statute [ATS] was enacted to promote."130
4. Conclusion and Disposition
The majority opinion concluded by holding that the above analysis led to the
inevitable disposition that the plaintiffs' claim against the defendants must be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.1 3 ' Accordingly,
the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling related to its dismissal of the
claims against the corporate defendants and reversed the lower court "insofar as it
declined to dismiss" the outstanding claims against the defendants. 1 32
C. The ConcurringOpinion
Judge Leval issued a separate opinion concurring only in judgment. Though
he believed the majority correctly dismissed the claims against the defendantsalbeit on grounds that the plaintiffs failed to "plead a violation of the law of
nations" 33-the bulk of Judge Leval's concurrence was designed to undermine the
majority opinion's primary holding. 134 Judge Leval's disagreement with the
majority's approach to ATS liability was strident in both its terms and language.' 35
Indeed, even the majority opinion mentioned from the outset of its analysis that
they were "perplexed by Judge Leval's repeated insistence that there is no 'basis"'
for their holding.' 36 According to Judge Leval, the majority's approach would
usher in a system where "one who earns profits by commercial exploitation of
abuse of fundamental human rights can successfully shield those profits from
victims' claims for compensation simply by taking the precaution of conducting

129. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 141.
131. Id. at 149.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 188, 196 (Leval, J., concurring).
134. See id. at 149-88.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 120 (majority opinion) (quoting id. at 151) (Leval, J., concurring) (noting that the
majority's position lacked support from adequate precedent and scholarship).
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the heinous operation in the corporate form."' 37 In a sense, Judge Leval argued,
Kiobel would usher in a new era of "unscrupulous businesses advantages ... never
before dreamed of."' 38
The main thrust of Judge Leval's concurrence rested on the simple difference
between criminal and civil liability.' 39 Though the majority cited rather persuasive
authority claiming international law is generally blind to the later distinction,14 0
Judge Leval found the majority's reliance on criminaltribunals to discern a lack of
international consensus regarding corporate liability to be wholly misplaced in
ATS jurisprudence.141 This conclusion stemmed from the basic scope and
structure of the ATS-a device designed to award plaintiffs civil tort damages for
aliens who have been harmed by a violation of the law of nations.142 If viewed
alone as a creature of civil tort law, then ATS liability-according to Judge
Leval-cannot be reconciled with the majority's reliance on the refusal of
international tribunals to criminally prosecute corporations.1 43 As Judge Leval
opined:
The reasons why international tribunals have been established without
jurisdiction to impose criminal liability on corporations have to do
solely with the theory and the objectives of criminalpunishment, and
have no bearing on civil compensatory liability. The view is widely held
among the nations of the world that criminal punishments (under
domestic law, as well as international law) are inappropriate for
corporations. This view derives from two perceptions: First, that
criminal punishment can be theoretically justified only where the
defendant has acted with criminal intent-a condition that cannot exist
when the defendant is a juridical construct which is incapable of having
an intent; and second, that criminal punishments are pointless and
counterproductive when imposed on a fictitious juridical entity because
they fail to achieve the punitive objectives of criminal punishment. For
these reasons many nations in their domestic laws impose criminal
punishments only on natural persons, and not on juridical ones. In
contrast, the imposition of civil liability on corporations serves perfectly
the objective of civil liability to compensate victims for the wrongs
inflicted on them and is practiced everywhere in the world. The fact that
international tribunals do not impose criminal punishment on
corporations in no way supports the inference that corporations are
outside the scope of international law and therefore can incur no civil

137. Id. at 149-50 (Leval, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 150.
139. See id, at 151.

140. See id. at 146-47.
141. Id. at 151-52.
142. Id. at 151.
143. See id.
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compensatory liability to victims when they engage in conduct
prohibited by the norms of international law.'"
He then noted that "[i]ntemational law distinguishes clearly between them
[criminal and civil liability] and provides differently for the different objectives of
criminal punishment and civil compensatory liability." 4 5 The majority's
purported legal flaw, that there was no dividing line between the two, prompted
Judge Leval to believe that "international law takes no position" and thus grants
each nation individual discretion whether they wish to impose civil liability on
international tortfeasors.1 46
In addition to his conclusion that criminal punishment of corporations is not a
recognized aspect of criminal law, the concurrence also claimed that the majority
opinion was inconsistent with Sosa, argued that corporations are "subjects" of
international law, and took Sosa's footnote twenty out of context.147 A large
portion of Judge Leval's concurrence regarding footnote twenty will be used to
develop the main thesis of this Article's analysis in Section IV.
IV. ANALYSIS
As noted above, the Second Circuit relied heavily on footnote twenty of the
Sosa opinion in holding that liability under the Alien Tort Statute was governed by
international, and not domestic, legal norms.14 8 This Article will argue that the
court's interpretation of footnote twenty was incorrect.
It is crucial to better understand the background of footnote twenty, as the
Second Circuit offered little in its majority opinion. Justice Souter's opinion in
Sosa can be categorized-at least in relevant part to Alvarez's ATS claims-into
three main prongs. In the first prong, the Court held the ATS was jurisdictional in
nature, affirmed that it had "practical effect the moment it became law"-thus
granting jurisdiction for claims based on piracy, safe conduct, and ambassador
relations-and devised a historical test for federal courts to confer jurisdiction over
additional international "norm[s] of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms." 49
In the second prong, the Court argued against Justice Scalia's concurrence.
Though Justice Scalia agreed that the three 18th century claims were applicable
under the ATS, he disagreed that "today's law of nations may ever be recognized
legitimately by federal courts in the absence of congressional action." so In other
words, Justice Scalia believed that the historical test created by the majority-

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 164-78.
See id. at 126 (majority opinion).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
Id. at 729.
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designed to ensure that "the door [to the federal courts] is still ajar subject to
vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms
today"-was incompatible without further legislation.' 5 1 In response to this
argument, Justice Souter noted that the courts "would welcome any congressional
guidance in exercising jurisdiction . .. [yet] nothing Congress has done is a reason
for us to shut the door to the law of nations entirely."l 52
The third and final prong of Sosa-the one in which footnote twenty
appears-is the portion of the opinion that applies the Court's new historical test
against the specific arbitrary detention claim raised by Alvarez-Machain under the
ATS.15 3 Footnote twenty appears in the first paragraph of this section-as part of
its third and closing sentence-following a series of standard legal principles
discussing the criteria for applicable norms of customary international law.1 54 In
fact, the entire paragraph is devoted to elaborating, more or less, on the Paquette
Habana approach to discerning customary international law.' 55 For instance, the
Court noted in the second sentence that an actionable norm of customary
international law must be accepted among civilized nations, and quoted Filartiga's
well-known passage that "for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has becomelike the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind."156
In the third and final sentence of the paragraph, the Court included additional
substance to its historical test, opining that "the determination whether a norm is
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably
must) involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of making
that cause available to litigants in federal courts."' 5 7 It is right after the "to support
a cause of action" language that Justice Souter inserted footnote twenty. The full
text of footnote twenty is as follows:
A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.
Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-795

(C.A.D.C.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient consensus in
1984 that torture by private actors violates international law), with
Kadic v. Karddzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241 (C.A.2 1995) (sufficient
consensus in 1995 that genocide by private actors violates international
law).

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

158

Id.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 731-32.
Id. at 732.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 732-33 (emphasis added).
Id. at 732 n.20.
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A. Liability Distinctfrom Cause ofAction
From the outset, it is obvious that the surrounding text of footnote twenty is
focused on one subject only: the requisite methodology for determining whether an
ATS cause ofaction is viable. In this sense, the cause of action emphasis is related
to the Paquette Habana approach for identifying international claims. Nowhere,
however, does the opinion's text relate-even remotely-to the issue of ATS
liability. That is, if the Second Circuit's interpretation of footnote twenty is
correct, the language of the footnote is at the very least wholly independent from
the text of the opinion itself. It is not a sufficient legal basis to assume the two are
linked inextricably; the viability of a substantive legal norm under the ATS is
simply a distinct concept from the list of possible defendants subject to ATS
liability. The language of the footnote, it then follows, must justify the Second
Circuit's position-a requirement that is not met.
The one and only sentence of footnote twenty states that "[a] related
consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or individual."' 5 9 If read in a vacuum, and without any
further guidance, it would perhaps be understandable as to why the Second Circuit
felt so strongly that Sosa prohibited ATS claims against corporations. In a sense,
the language of the footnote is ambiguous with regard to its application of ATS
claims versus ATS liability. Certainly, if other indicators were absent, the Second
Circuit would have stronger justification for its holding. The footnote does make
clear in simple language that (1) international law controls issues of liability under
the ATS and (2) juridical entities, such as corporations, as non-state actors are not
definitively liable if international law so directs. The Second Circuit took this
language as the basis for engaging in a customary international law analysis to
determine whether juridical persons are liable for violations of the law of nations.
As discussed supra in Part III, the Second Circuit found that the pertinent treaties,
norms, and sources indicated the law of nations did not mandate that such entities
are liable for international harms.
This analysis is changed, however, when one considers the citations on which
footnote twenty relies. Justice Souter included reference to two major ATS circuit
court cases-the concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic and the
majority opinion in Kadic v. Karddzic. In Tel-Oren, the D.C. Court of Appeals
discussed and held, inter alia, that torture committed by private individuals does
not violate customary international law.16 0 Likewise, in Kadic, the Second Circuit
held that the act of genocide, even if committed by private actors, is a violation of
the law of nations.' 6' And though these cases appear to discuss the divide between
juridical and State actors, they both represent a different premise than the issue
159. Id.
160. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
161. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1995).
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presented in Kiobel: whether the law of nations holds corporate defendants liable
for violations of international harms. As Judge Leval said in his dissent,
"[n]othing in the Tel-Oren or Kadic opinions suggests in any way that the law of
nations might distinguish between conduct of a natural person and of a
corporation. They distinguish only between private and State action."l62 In other
words, while Kiobel is concerned with the appropriateness of ATS liability for
corporations-converse from Nuremberg's jurisdictional grant covering
individuals exclusively-the case law serving as the basis for footnote twenty is
related uniquely to whether the laws of nations is still violated, for a particular
internationally recognized harm, when the perpetrator is a private party rather
than the State.
We are then left with a basic equation for understanding the distinction
between footnote twenty and Kiobel: footnote twenty pertains to whether an
international law violation is triggeredby a particularactor while Kiobel rests on
whether a juridical defendant can successfully be sued under the law of nations.
B. Applying the Formulato Typical ATS Claims
The distinction outlined above is best understood when applied practically.
As an illustrative example, consider two separate cases with an identical fact
pattern. In the first case, the issue is controlled by Kiobel, and in the second,
footnote twenty, Kadic, and Tel-Oren is the dispositive law.
1. The Private Defendant
The facts are as follows: plaintiff, a man of Sudanese nationality, brings suit
in federal district court under the ATS seeking tort damages for genocide. Plaintiff
names, among others, a corporation that aided the Sudanese government in
carrying out the killings by financing parts of the State's operation. Assume also
that the plaintiff can show injury (i.e., the death of a family member), and the
corporation is deemed to be complicit in the genocide.
In the first case, we apply Kiobel. Since the defendant is a corporation, the
issue would turn on whether international law mandates dismissal of the ATS
claim by virtue of the defendant's juridical nature. Here, international law has
spoken clearly on the extent of liability for genocide. Because those who commit
the act of genocide are considered hostis humani generis (an enemy of all
mankind), a corporate entity may be liable for commission of such an offense.
Culpability for the defendant would thus be a foregone conclusion.
Conversely, assume the same set of facts, but footnote twenty is the
dispositive law. If applied with due deference to Kadic and Tel-Oren, plaintiffs
claim would now turn on the character of the perpetrator. Instead of Kiobel's
concern of whether the corporation could be liable under the law of nations,

162. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 165 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J.,
concurring).
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footnote twenty would seek to ensure that the underlying claim-genocide, in this
instance-was itself a cause of action that the juridical entity in question could
commit and, irrespective of that entity's private or public composition, still rise to
the status of a customary international law violation. In the case of our plaintiff,
under the Kadic rule, the international norm condemning genocide is so
pronounced that it is considered a violation of the law of nations when committed
either by a juridical entity or the State. In other words, the private corporation is
capable of committing the offense so as to render it a violation of customary
international law. This is dissimilar from Kiobel, in that it is concerned with a
workable cause of action and not potential liability of the defendant.
The key distinction is more evident when analyzing an ATS violation that
fails because a private actor cannot serve as the culprit. Assume in arguendo, the
cause of action brought by the Sudanese plaintiff is torture rather than genocide.
Torture, unlike genocide, is a violation of customary international law only when
inflicted by State actors. If this were the case, plaintiffs ATS claim against the
corporate defendant would clearly not survive as a consequence of footnote twenty
and Tel-Oren. More precisely, plaintiff will have failed to state a claim recognized
under international law because private corporations are precluded from violating
the law of nations by engaging in torture. While the result under Kiobel is
unchanged, the altered claim demonstrates the competing motivation for footnote
twenty.
The difference is certainly subtle, but nonetheless persuasive and important.
When re-read in this context, footnote twenty takes on another meaning. As Judge
Leval wrote:
If the violated norm is one that international law applies only against
States, then "a private actor, such as a corporation or an individual,"
who acts independently of a State, can have no liability for violation of
the law of nations because there has been no violation of the law of
nations. On the other hand, if the conduct is of the type classified as a
violation of the norms of international law regardless of whether done
by a State or a private actor, then "a private actor, such as a corporation
or an individual," has violated the law of nations and is subject to
liability in a suit under the ATS.163
2. The State Defendant
Consider now the case of an ATS claim involving a State-actor defendant
with an unsettled cause of action. In this example, plaintiff brings suit against the
Sudanese government for accepting bribes to initiate oil operations in various
Sudanese villages. Some time after drilling begins, plaintiff alleges an oil
company murdered and tortured his family for protesting the negative
environmental impact of the company's operations. Plaintiff also names the

163. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Sudanese government in the ATS complaint for purported violations of customary
international law by aiding and abetting the company by accepting kickbacks to
secure corporate oil leases in the region.
Through Kiobel, it is clear the Sudanese government is a plausible defendant
under international law. As noted above, the ATS clearly delineates the authority
of federal courts to hear cases against public actors for violations of customary
international law. However, footnote twenty and its related case law would beg
the following questions: (1) does international law recognize a cause of action for
killings and tortures perpetrated by private companies, and, (2) under international
law, does a cause of action exist against a State-actor that aids and abets a private
company commit murder and torture? By flipping the issue in Kiobel-that is,
placing emphasis on the cause of action rather than the defendant-one can better
see that footnote twenty controls possible claims instead of possible defendants.
C. Revisiting the Second Circuit'sApproach Through a New Lens
A different view of footnote twenty was also supported by an influential
amici-the European Commission. According to the Commission:
[O]nly a subset of norms recognized as customary international law
applies to non-state actors, such as corporations, and hence only that
subset may form the basis of liability against such actors. For example,
non-state actors may be liable for genocide, war crimes, and piracy,
while torture, summary execution, and prolonged arbitrary detention do
not violate the law of nations unless they are committed by state
officials or under color of law.'
Possible negative reaction to Kiobel's interpretation of footnote twenty should
not be surprising. After all, it was contained in a section of Sosa devoted entirely
to espousing the validity of ATS claims. The footnote even follows the phrase
"cause of action."165
To point out the inaccuracy of the Second Circuit's approach, we return to the
specific language in Kiobel: "based on international law, Sosa, and our own
precedents-that international law, and not domestic law, governs the scope of
liability for violations of customary international law under the ATS.",,,66 Though
other sources of international law may eventually validate the holding of Kiobel,
what is concerning about the case is that it places undue influence on Sosa and
internal circuit precedent. The Second Circuit did not interpret the difference
between footnote twenty and the issue in Kiobel as narrowly as this Article. Citing
Talisman, the Second Circuit argued that "footnote 20 of Sosa, while nominally
concerned with the liability of non-state actors, supports the broader principle that
the scope of liability for ATS violations should be derived from international

164. Id. at 165 n.17.
165. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
166. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126.
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law."167 It would be hard for the Supreme Court, on review of an appellate
decision, to agree that footnote twenty is only "nominally concerned" with liability
of non-state actors. The Second Circuit in Talisman, like Kiobel, appears to have
interpreted footnote twenty to turn on whether the law of nations recognizes a
cause of action instead of whether a particular defendant is liable for such a
violation.
Thus, the Second Circuit's conclusion that footnote twenty controls the issue
in Kiobel is a clear misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's emphasis on Tel-Oren
and Kadic. It appears the court read the language through the lens of Kiobel, and
failed to understand the true motivation for Justice Souter's insertion of footnote
twenty into Sosa. At first blush, the text of the footnote is supportive of Kiobel's
holding but, upon further inspection, pertains to a separate issue of ATS
jurisprudence. Though other sources of international law-such as the Second
Circuit's reliance on international tribunals and the work of scholars-may
vindicate Kiobel, litigants should be wary of citing Kiobel for the proposition that
juridical defendants are shielded from liability under the ATS. Instead, they
should undergo a typical customary international law analysis, mimicking other
portions of the Second Circuit's opinion.
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article was twofold. First, to provide an objective
analysis of the Kiobel case-including the factual background, court rulings, and
majority and concurring opinions. Second, this Article was designed to show the
fallacy that the Second Circuit relied on to bolster its holding that international law
dictates the boundaries of ATS liability. Footnote twenty of the Sosa opinion,
though illuminating in other aspects, is not applicable to the disposition of Kiobel.
On account of this fallacy, it is important for future ATS litigants to be mindful of
the trap Kiobel has laid.
The conclusion of this article rests on the following premise: both the Kiobel
decision and footnote twenty should not serve as the primary basis for asserting the
law of nations governs ATS liability. Instead, a wise litigant would be mindful of
the Second Circuit's other arguments-the ones flowing from the traditional
Paquette Habanaapproach-such as the use of international tribunals, treaties, and
academic treatises to either support or undermine the claim that the law of nations
is binding on ATS liability and defendants.

167. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009).

